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ANSE, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State ex rel. County of Clark, 
124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 74 (Sep. 25, 2008)1
CIVIL – RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTIONAL DEFECT
Summary
Petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court order denying partial 
summary judgment.
Disposition/Outcome
Denied the petition for writ of mandamus and affirmed the district court’s denial for 
partial summary judgment.  The Nevada Supreme Court held that subsequent owners of a “new 
residence” under NRS 40.615 may seek residential construction defect remedies under NRS 
Chapter 40 if instituted within the applicable statute of repose.   
Factual and Procedural History
The real parties in interest initiated a construction defect action against Sun City 
Summerlin’s developers, including petitioner Dell Webb Communities, Inc. alleging defects in 
the exterior stucco of their residences.   Real parties in interest sought remedies available under 
NRS 40.600 through NRS 40.695.  The action involved approximately 1200 residences in the 
Sun City Summerlin community in Las Vegas, Nevada.
Dell Webb then instituted a third party action against several subcontractors including 
ANSE, Inc., MS Concrete Company, Pratte Development Company, Inc., and Dean Roofing, 
Inc., petitioners herein.  
Petitioners moved the district court for partial summary judgment asserting that because 
approximately 700 of the residences were occupied as dwellings prior to the subsequent owners 
obtaining title, the residences are not “new” residences under NRS 40.615 and are not subject to 
actions for constructional defects under NRS Chapter 40.  Petitioners relied on the definition of a 
“new residence” set forth by the Nevada Supreme Court in Westpark Owners’ Ass’n v. Dist. Ct. 2 
In Westpark, the court determined a “new residence” is “a product of original construction that 
has been unoccupied as a dwelling from the completion of its construction until the point of 
sale.’”3  The district court denied the motion for partial summary judgment and petitioners filed a 
petition for mandamus relief.  
The Court exercised its discretion to consider the petition because petitioners may gain a 
direct benefit from issuance of a writ of mandamus and because the petition raised an important 
legal issue requiring clarification with regard to the definition of “new residence” set forth in 
Westpark.  
1 By Joanna M. Myers
2 Westpark Owner’s Ass’n. v. Dist. Ct., 167 P.3d 421, 427 (2007).  
3 Id. at 429.
Discussion 
The Nevada Supreme Court in Westpark defined “new residence” to mean “a product of 
original construction that has been unoccupied as a dwelling from the completion of its 
construction until the point of sale.”4  Relying on this definition, petitioners argued that homes 
which have not been continuously owned by the original purchasers do not qualify as a “new” 
residence.  Accordingly, petitioners asserted that subsequent owners are precluded from seeking 
remedies under NRS Chapter 40, herein approximately 700 homes, because when a home has 
had multiple owners, the homes were not unoccupied from the date of completion to the most 
recent and latest sale. 
The court responded by stating that petitioner’s expansion of the Westpark definition of 
“new residence” ignored the unique factual background of Westpark , violated the purpose of the 
statute, and lead to unreasonable and absurd results.  In addition, the petitioner’s interpretation 
significantly diminishes the statute’s remedies and protections to homeowners and developers by 
forcing parties to resolve disputes outside the statutory scheme, conflicting with the statute’s 
intent and affecting nearly 60 percent of the residences in this case.
The court determined petitioner’s definition of “new residence” would produce 
unreasonable results.  For example, the second owner of a one-year old residence would be 
precluded from seeking a remedy for a constructional defect because he is not the first owner.  A 
neighbor who is the original purchaser of an identical residence could seek remedies under NRS 
Chapter 40 for the same type of defect.  The court further explains petitioner’s definition would 
result in disparate treatment among similarly situated homeowners.  NRCP 25(c) provides an 
action may be “continued by or against the original party” in case of any transfer of interest, 
therefore providing that subsequent homeowners could maintain a course of action so long as the 
original purchaser initiated it.5  However, subsequent owners could not obtain NRS Chapter 40 
remedies if the defect had not been discovered previously by the original purchaser.       
      
The court explained that Westpark is factually distinguishable from the present action 
because it involved the distinct situation when, before its first sale, a residence is occupied as a 
dwelling.  In Westpark, condominiums were leased as apartments and occupied as dwellings for 
as long as seven years prior to being offered for sale.6   The court concluded that to classify such 
residences as “new” under NRS Chapter 40 would be erroneous.7  
The court therefore rejects the petitioner’s expanded meaning of “new residence” and 
clarifies that, as Westpark implied, a residence is considered “new" for constructional defect 
purposes if it is a “product of original construction that has been unoccupied as a dwelling from 
the completion of its construction until its original sale.” 8  Thus, subsequent owners are not 
precluded from seeking NRS Chapter 40 remedies if the residence meets the aforementioned 
requirement.  The court underscores that this definition is in harmony with NRS 40.610 which 
does not expressly require a claimant be the first owner and defines a constructional defect 
4 Westpark, 167 P.3d at 429.  
5 NEV. R. CIV. P 25(C). 
6 167 P.3d at 429.  
7 Id.  
8 ANSE, Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 74, 16-17 (Sep. 25, 2008).
claimant simply as “[a]n owner of a residence.”  The fact that a homeowner may not be the 
original owner does not preclude the owner from seeking remedies under NRS Chapter 40 if the 
home remained unoccupied as a dwelling from the completion of its construction to the point of 
the first sale.      
Conclusion
The Nevada Supreme Court clarified that “new residence” under NRS 40.615 is “a 
residence that has remained unoccupied as a dwelling from the completion of its construction to 
the point of its first sale.”9  In order for the term “new residence” to operate in harmony with the 
legislature’s intent, subsequent owners of that residence may seek NRS Chapter 40’s residential 
constructional defect remedies provided the action is brought within the applicable statute of  
repose.10  The court therefore denied the petition for a writ of mandamus and affirmed the district 
court’s denial of partial summary judgment. 
9 Id. at 18.
10 Id.
